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MAN IN SOCIETY
EARL

W.

KINTNER*

AN HAS SOUGHT TO UNDERSTAND himself since the dawn .of reason.
A mighty hurdle in this quest for understanding is the problem
of defining the proper relationship of man with his fellow men. Man
is a social being. Mankind has always lived in the context of a community, be it family, tribe, city, state, nation or a church. Since the
beginning of self-awareness man has sought the Good Society. The
sciences of politics and political economy are concerned with communal
relations. Philosophy and Religion are as much concerned with the
relation of man to other men as with the relation of man to God. Most
of man's religious systems exhibit as much compulsion to build the
City of God here as they do to attain the Kingdom of God hereafter.
Certainly our own religious heritage is full of a quest for the Good
Society. I must confess that I have not lately made a careful quantitative
analysis of the Old Testament, but I would venture that more of its
text is devoted to the effort to establish the proper relationship between
man and man than is devoted to the proper relationship of man to
God. Much of that volume is devoted to the Laws of Israel. Although
the laws are dispensed by Jehovah, their subject is communal relations.
The New Testament is much more concerned with the relationship of
man to God, but human relations are not slighted. After all, the Golden
Rule is .a rule of community relations.
I am going to examine our heritage as we focus briefly on man in
society, proceeding from the perspective of the individual and emphasizing the rights and duties of the individual. It is important to note
that many systems of thought do just the reverse. In them society, or
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a unit of society, is ot paramount importance and determines the perspective from
which all human relations are viewed. The
choice of the viewpoint of the individual
is an intensely Western and Christian
choice. Even in today's world this perspective by no means predominates. In the
East, despiie years of missionary effort and
cultural penetration from the West, the
perspective from which community relations are defined is still that of the family
or the nation. In the Communist system the
perspective is that of the "mass." Today
in emerging Africa we see the conflict between the perspective of the tribe and the
alien perspective of the individual. I do not
propose to engage in a comparison of
these perspectives at this time; I merely
announce my point of reference and proceed with the examination.
One's view of the proper role of man in
society depends in great measure on one's
view of man's nature. If 'one views man
as a rational being endowed with knowledge and imbued with love, then one's
view of human relationships is likely to be
very different from another who views man
as a creature prone to greed and lust and
fear. Plato very clearly recognized the importance of man's nature in constructing
his Republic. Thus, he felt impelled to
pose and solve the psychological problem
and the ethical problem before reaching the
final crystallization of the political problem.
I think it fair to say that most realistic
builders of the Good Society (and I
include our Founding Fathers in this category) have viewed man's nature as a pqadox - a combination of reason and fear,
love and lust, greed and unselfishness, a
creature capable of evil as well as good.
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In short they view man as a creature not
yet in a state of grace. Since this paradoxical creature is capable of good, he must
have liberty to pursue the good; since this
creature is capable of evil, restraints must
be placed on his conduct.
If man is a paradoxical creature then
human relationships must resolve a number of paradoxes, or if you prefer, solve a
number of equations. Let us presume that
in constructing our Good Society we wish
to give a high value to individual liberty.
Unless our Good Society is to be an anarchy
we have merely made a beginning by stating this first presumption. We still must
strike a balance between the need for order
and the need for freedom, the need for
orthodoxy and the need for innovation,
the rights of majorities and the rights of
minorities, the duty of governors and the
duty of the governed. And our Good Society is not completely built even when
these difficult equations are solved. So far
we have been talking about the difficulties
encountered in constructing the framework,
the constitution if you will, of our Good
Society. Before we finish our project we
must examine the procedures we would
specify, one, to change the basic structure
if events prove change necessary; and, two,
the procedures that will govern the day-today conduct of human relations within
the societal framework.
The first of these procedures could be
labelled the amending procedure. No
human constitution-maker is wise enough
to foresee all pressures that may assail his
framework. Therefore, the constitution
must include some. ,process for orderly
change. The structure of the amending
procedure and the role that it plays in the
operation of the Good Society has received
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little attention from political philosophers.
Perhaps a certain ungovernable egotism impels men to believe that their view of the
Good Society will endure for all time to
come. The whole course of human history
teaches us that no man has yet reached
-that pinnacle. Therefore, the Good Society
must provide some procedure for converting today's heresy into tomorrow's orthodoxy if it is to endure.

revolutionary. Others would say that evolutionary change is not only possible but
inevitable and that the framework of the
society must contain some orderly procedure for effectuating such changes. In
this connection you may find it interesting
to read a recent article by Professor Wilmoore Kendall entitled "On Reading
Milton's Areopagitica." It appears in the
May, 1960, issue of The Journal of Politics.

This brief glance at the necessity for an
amending procedure conjures up a host of
interesting questions. For instance, I have
just used the words "orthodoxy" and
"heresy." This usage leads me to consider
the place of shared values in human institutions. Certain it is that no viable human
institution can exist without some orthodoxy, without some shared values, however
limited and specialized those values may be.
When we speak of a free society generally
we do not mean that the society has no
orthodoxy; we mean only that there is an
opportunity for pluralistic development
within the confines of that orthodoxy. Tolstoi has wisely said, "If the will of man
were free, that is, if every man could act
as he chose, the whole history would be
a tissue of disconnected accidents." One
dilemma confronting the builder of the
Good Society is how much questioning of
the orthodoxy will be allowed. When are
shared values no longer shared? Does an
institution crumble when its orthodoxy is
questioned? Or can it survive if some
orderly process for amending its values by
some evolutionary means is provided? It is
at this point we can discern a cleavage between the builders of the Good Society.
Some would say that there can be no evolutionary changes in orthodoxy if the society
is to continue; any change must needs be

We must now consider the second type
of procedure necessary to the Good Society
that I mentioned earlier. This is the procedure for devising and enforcing the laws
and ordinances that govern the day-to-day
conduct of the citizenry. This procedure
must envision two processes. First there
must be .a process for orderly law-making.
This orderly process must be built largely
on compromise if our Good Society is a
diverse one. And second, a fair process of
law enforcement - termed by our forefathers as due process - must be devised.
Only when these procedures are linked
to the basic structure do we have a complete view of the Good Society.
Now that we have viewed some of the
elements necessary to construct the Good
Society, we can see how very complex
that society must be even if it is premised
upon maximum individual liberty. Why
must this be so? To answer this question,
we must refer once more to the nature of
man. We have said that man is a complex
mixture of ideals, impulses and motives.
Is it any wonder that the complexity of
man should be reflected in the complexity
of the state? A concomitant explanation can
be found in the imperfect nature of man.
Since men and societies must grope for
truth amidst uncertainties, there must be a
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place in the Good Society for competition
and compromise. There must be some adversary procedure for determining choices.
Any society that allows a place for competition must impose complex controls, lest
that competition become antisocial.
What is the place of religion in the Good
Society? It seems to me that religion has
two places, one in the realm of motives and
one in the realm of restraints. If the Good
Society is to endure, then men must be
motivated to constantly build a better society. And if men are to live together harmoniously, then each man must respect the
rights of others and recognize restraints
upon his own conduct at those points where
harm to others might ensue. It is at this point
that religion plays its most vital role. The
freest society is the society in which a
maximum number of needed restraints are
self-imposed. Religious man is guided by
his ethical precepts and, therefore, exercises self-discipline. Therefore, there is less
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need to impose discipline upon religious
man. Religious man recognizes that each
freedom carries with it a concomitant
responsibility and that an opportunity for
individual development is not an opportunity for self-aggrandizement. Obviously,
then, a society composed of religious men
can give a higher precedence to individual
liberty than a society composed of irreligious
men.
It should be obvious by now that our
questing voyage has come full circle. Like
Plato, we find that the role of man in society
and the proper relationship of man to his
fellows depends upon an understanding of
the nature of man. Like Plato, we find that
we must solve the psychological problem
and the ethical problem before we can
solve the political problem. After all, the
building blocks that we must use to construct the City of God are the hearts and
minds of men, women and children.

